Sybilguard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks
by Haifeng Yu, Michael Kaminsky, Philip Gibbons, Abraham Flaxman
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| url: | http://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2006/discussion/getpaper.php?paper_id=26 | | booktitle: | Proceedings of the {ACM} {SIGCOMM} 2006 Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications, Pisa, Italy | | abstract: | Peer-to-peer and other decentralized, distributed systems are known
to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack, a
malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be
multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction
of the nodes in the system, the malicious user is able to “out vote”
the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure
defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for
limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks. Our protocol
is based on the “social network” among user identities, where an
edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust
relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few
trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately-small “cut” in
the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard
exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious
user can create. We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both
analytically and experimentally. | | type: | inproceedings | | journal: | IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw | | year: | 2006 |
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